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American Constitutionalism. University of Virginia Press, $37.50 hardcover
ISBN 813923425
Let Us Now Praise Practical MenBenjamin Curtis and he Dangers of
Principled Pragmatism
Benjamin Curtis served on the U.S. Supreme Court from 1851 to 1857, and
was intellectually active during a time of intense and widespread debate about
the meaning of various Constitutional provisions, and of constitutionalism in
general. Discussion was emphatically not reserved to the intellectual classes, and
at any moment one could find newspaper editorials, sermons, pamphlets, popular
magazines, debating societies and political speeches addressing questions
ranging from secession to the commerce clause. Curtis could only flourish in
such conditions: he seems to have been born to argue, and delighted in the
technicality and minuti of the law. Both luck and talent led Curtis to occupy, in
Struart Streichler's words, a position at the center of a contest over American
constitutionalism that was waged not in abstract terms but in actual controversies
over power and individual rights (xi-xii). From this position, Curtis was able to
challenge in succession the highest court, the president, and the Congress for
abusing power (209). His challenge to Congress took the form of an adroit and
creative defense of Andrew Johnson at his impeachment trial, while his
challenge to Lincoln came in the form of an extended argument against his use
of military tribunals for civilians. But it was the first event û Curtis scolding the
Supreme Court in a blistering dissent in Dred Scott, that led Streichler to
investigate his life and thought more fully.
Streichler, Fulbright Lecturer in the Graduate School of Law and the 
Department of American Studies at Tohoku University, found himself drawn to 
write about Curtis by the justice's withering û and highly influential û dissent in 
the infamous Dred Scott v. Sanford case of 1857, a case which seemed to many
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to indicate that the Supreme Court had simply gone insane. Streichler was mildly
surprised to find the field of Curtis Studies largely unoccupied, the only
biography being a memoir published in 1879 by Curtis' brother, and set about to
remedy that.
He seems to have collected quite sufficient data about the life and thought of
Curtis to have written the traditional biography û his endnotes are almost as
enjoyable to read as the main text û but thankfully he is not interested either in
detailing the trivia of Curtis' life as a lad or in interpreting his thought as the
result of various childhood traumas or the Ineluctable Forces of History. There is
indeed relatively little biographical fact: just enough to place the man in context,
to broadly outline the major events of his life, and to give the reader some sense
of his character.
It is exactly the right approach, for it gives Streichler room to examine what
interested him (and us) about Curtis in the first place: his thought and its impact
on the constitutional history of the Civil War era (xi). But this approach can
make a book like this devilishly hard to organize. Presenting biographical data in
chronological order at least creates a work which in some sense tells a story,
albeit perhaps a boring or unimportant one. Some authors who, like Streichler,
wish to concentrate on abstractions and thought, are aided by a clear
developmental path in either the content of the subject's thought or the mode of
analysis. Streichler has no such luck. Benjamin Curtis' thought process seems to
show no developmental path whatsoever. There is neither maturation nor
degeneration, neither increasing sophistication nor discernable winnowing. This
is not to say that he never changed his position on anything, but he seems to have
come on the scene with an unshakeable set of core assumptions and techniques
and to have applied them indiscriminately to everything he examined in the field
of Constitutional law, throughout his career.
This makes Streichler's task of organization a bit more difficult. In order to 
tell a story, he rather loosely groups Curtis' commentary around major events 
more-or-less chronologically presented. But in order to examine the thought, 
Streichler has to jump back and forth now and then, reminding readers of what 
has been said before, and giving little previews of coming attractions to be 
examined later. That he manages to do this without confusing or annoying the 
reader is testament to his clear and engaging writing style and his remarkable 
grasp of the meaning and implications of Curtis' own work. The result is a 
beautiful case study of a legal thinker whose main guiding principle seems to
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have been that of not having any guiding principle.
Now a crack like that clearly demands explanation, and I hasten to note that
I am not referring to anything distasteful or scandalous in Curtis' life, but merely
recognizing his unremitting pragmatism in approaching life and law: Curtis was
above all else a lawyer in the most literal sense of the term. He loved the law,
living in it like a fish in a pond, and seems to have believed from the beginning
that if we would all simply live our lives like the truest of lawyers, most of our
problems could ultimately be resolved to most of our mutual satisfaction. But for
this to happen, Curtis would have us distinguish between a lawyer and a
lawgiver: only the latter can afford to be concerned with highfalutin ideals and
principles and grand theories of human nature. True lawyers take the law as they
find it and apply it to circumstances as they find them: arguing, debating,
pushing and shoving, dealing and compromising and searching out middle
ground to produce practical solutions which contestants can find acceptable, if
not perfect.
Where does such a lawyer find such law? In the deposit of the legal culture,
and in particular in Curtis' beloved common law. Curtis's constitutionalism was
grounded above all else in the common law (5), notes Streichler, and his
approach to both political theory and constitutional development can probably
best be characterized by a phrase made popular in the twentieth century by the
philosopher of science, Karl Popper: piecemeal engineering. A foe of political
metaphysics (14), Curtis rejected idealistic reasoning as being far too simplistic
for the extraordinary complexity that besets political affairs. Wholesale solutions
based upon mental gymnastics alone simply aggravate problems by forcing
solutions to conform to theory, instead of the reverse. There is instead a practical
wisdom based in experience which far outperforms abstract reasoning from a
priori principles:
He believed that each generation adapted social and political practices to
meet the needs of its day, the institutional arrangements that emerged over time
reflected the collective experience of successive generations. Because the
political knowledge of any single generation was limited by its own experience,
it followed that no present generation was likely to understand fully the merits of
the institutions that had evolved to that point. (15)
The parallels to Burke are obvious, and it should come as no surprise that
Curtis found himself at home in the Whig party and, like Burke, viewed both law
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and liberties as an entitled inheritance (15).
This point of view found expression in Curtis' method of constitutional
interpretation, which he referred to as practical construction. By this he seemed
to mean, according to Streichler, that the judiciary, in interpreting the
Constitution, was obliged to give substantial weight to the practices of the
elected representatives of the people (22). Such deference must not be taken to
the point of a wholesale surrender to popular opinion expressed in the coordinate
branches, however: Curtis believed that elite lawyers and judges must serve as a
check on uninformed opinion, through their understanding of the common law --
the deposit of faith, as it were -- found expressed in the decisions and reasoning
of hundreds of actual court cases throughout American and English history.
Curtis was clearly on to something here, of course, and many excellent
arguments have been made in support of the famously-British science of
muddling through political problems, and against sacrificing practical reasoning
on the altar of ideological consistency û notably by Popper himself (Cf.
especially his The Poverty of Historicism). But any first-year law student can
articulate the dangers in over-reliance on precedent to resolve legal problems. In
principle, the idea seems unassailable: deciding like cases in like manner seems
manifestly fair, and produces an agreeable consistency of policy which both
hints at some underlying universality of principles of justice and provides a
consensus about the rulebook according to which the game of life may be
played. These are highly desirable outcomes.
In practice, however, problems arise. In the first place, every case, perhaps
merely by virtue of being a case, is arguably unique. No matter how many, or
what proportion, of circumstances surrounding one resemble those of another,
they can at most only resemble them, and cases are therefore decided not only on
their merits, but by prior argument about which circumstances are relevant to the
comparison, and whether they permit cases to be differentiated. In addition, it
doesn't take long for there to develop a large number of past cases, many only
subtly different from one another, from which a court may take guidance. If the
deposit of the common law is large enough, courts may cherry-pick precedent on
their way to deciding cases arbitrarily. Precedent is chosen to fit the desired
outcome rather than ruling and guiding decisions û no entitled inheritance is
transmitted, and both the practical and symbolic benefits of uniformity may be
lost.
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And all this is beside what is perhaps the greatest difficulty of all:
consistently deciding cases the way they were decided in the past only works to
our benefit if past cases were decided correctly in the first place. Let us only
briefly imagine a world in which Plessy v. Ferguson were still the law of the
land.
Curtis seems not to have lost much sleep over these worries. If he did
consider them, Streichler has uncovered no soul-searching commentary or has
not presented it. We must suspect that it does not exist. The style of Curtis'
arguments is consistent throughout: it is what is called in classical rhetoric
arguing from circumstance, and naturally enough, it produces differing results
when presented with different circumstances.
Streichler himself senses the problem when he notes in several places in the
book that he is troubled by Curtis' varying stands on the matter of race. He seems
to have expected the hero of Dred Scott to have been a consistent abolitionist or
-- even rarer for the time -- an anti-racist. But in fact, the man never developed
anything close to a principled position in these matters, and actually defended
the Fugitive Slave Law in public oratory and from the bench; once famously û
and for a newly-appoint justice, rather bafflingly û instructing a federal grand
jury that forcible resistance to the law constituted treason (39). Streichler does
not defend Curtis' variability on these matters û far from it û but he is willing to
chalk it all up to the exigencies of the time, and reminds us of the dangers of
judging from a twentieth-century perspective.
But in fact, such inconsistencies are themselves consistent with Curtis' stated 
objective of seeking practical solutions within the context of the contemporary 
law and of eschewing any appeal to ideals. Even when Curtis seems to Streichler 
to be on the right side of the issue, his pragmatic distaste for political 
metaphysics produces results which are a bit unsetting and even unsatisfying on 
their own terms. In not-so-popular lore, Dred Scott is remembered as the case in 
which the Court pronounced people of black African descent to be incapable of 
acquiring U. S. citizenship. Naturally, if Curtis objected to this decision, we tend 
to think that he must have had in mind some ringing defense of the Declaration's 
ideal of the equality of all men, regardless of race, etc. But in fact, Curtis' 
dissent, as Streichler ably shows, was based mainly on arguing from the 
historical fact that some black persons were legally citizens at the time of the 
Constitution's adoption û some may even have voted during ratification û and it 
therefore could not have been the intent of the Framers to incorporate Chief
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Justice Taney's notion into the document. In other words, had there been no such
historical evidence, or had there been evidence that the Framers had such an
intention, Curtis might very well have voted with the majority. As it was,
Curtis's scheme led to some curious results. For one thing, a native-born
person's claim to U.S. citizenship was conclusively determined by state of birth .
. . . Then, too, following Curtis's approach, nothing in the federal Constitution
prevented all of the states from disqualifying free blacks from citizenship. (128)
Practical problems resulting from practical solutions, in an attempt to avoid
metaphysics.
Another example of adroit practicality ultimately failing to satisfy may be
seen in Curtis' majority opinion in Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Philadelphia
(1852). Streichler puts his finger directly upon the main point:
Before Cooley, the justices abstractly considered these questions in terms of
sovereign power... Justice Curtis refocused the inquiry. He suggested that
practical regulatory needs should guide the decision-making process, that the
states had the power to regulate interstate commerce but not in every case, and
that the Supreme Court had the authority under the commerce clause to nullify
State laws when Congress had not acted. (67)
Curtis is impatient with the pedants who spend their days wrangling over
arcane and sterile ideas of sovereignty, human liberty and Natural Law: he wants
to get things done, and so proposes a practical compromise in what becomes
known as the dormant commerce clause doctrine. When Congress regulates
some aspect of interstate commerce, States may not, but if Congress has not
occupied the field, states may regulate so long as the subject and effects of those
regulations (as in the pilotage requirements at issue in Cooley) are strictly local.
There are two ways, therefore, in which a subject of interstate commerce may
become national in nature and be placed under Congressional gis: through
Congressional preemption or through judicial determination.
Interestingly, [o]nce the justices declared a subject of interstate commerce 
national' that was a determination Congress could not reverse (84). What this 
means in practice is that the development of the law of commerce acquires a 
kind of ratchet, put in place by Benjamin Curtis. Over the years, in great part as 
the result of this idea, more and more regulatory power would accrue to the
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national level, and there would be no looking back. Curtis' practical solution to
the problem would, in effect, decide the metaphysical question of the limits of
sovereignty in a federation.
Curtis would have appreciated this result, but, of course, from practical
reasons. Above all, law must produce the uniformity alluded to earlier, that
results in a comforting predictability, the sine qua non for practical success in
life. Increasing concentration of decision-making power in the national
government combined with increasing ability of the Supreme Court to
standardize judicial interpretation were trends he approved, for precisely that
reason.
Nothing comes without cost, however, and the price of such practical
uniformity is the deep-set feeling that it is merely artificial, a function of
particular judges interpreting particular circumstances. Streichler's comment on
Cooley's impact is instructive:
More enduring than Cooley's specific formula were Curtis's basic
propositions: first, that the Supreme Court could articulate the constitutional
principles organizing national and state powers to regulate commerce; and
second, that this would be done around some commonsensical understanding of
how the federal system operates (97)
More enduring, indeed. The difficulty is twofold. In the first place, how the
federal system operates is simply not the same thing as how the federal system
should operate. By refocusing the inquiry, to use Streichler's polite way of
describing it, Curtis commits the naturalistic fallacy. If we take a less charitable
view than Streichler, and instead suppose that Curtis was actively preventing
such questions from being raised, a more sinister possibility emerges.
More disturbing, perhaps, is the way in which total reliance upon such 
commonsensical understanding can deprive constitutional jurisprudence of its 
ultimate value. The Constitution is meant to lead, to be our guide in working our 
way through uncertain territory. We turn to it as the supreme law of the land to 
determine how other more specific and topical laws are to be formulated. 
Relying instead on historical conditions to decide what the Constitution in fact 
means inverts that relationship, dethroning the Constitution and subordinating it 
to the judicial recognition of mere circumstance (can arguments from 
consequence such as Wickard v. Filburn be far behind?) and depriving us of
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guidance.
Uniformity may still be had, through the expedient of superordinating the
Supreme Court, an agreeably practical solution to Curtis, no doubt. But it is a
uniformity of the Hollow Men whose heads may as well be filled with straw as
with legal principle, and the sought-after government of laws and not men will
become wind in dry grass.
Michael Berheide is a Professor in the Department of Political Science at
Berea College, and he is convinced that the South has _already_ risen again.
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